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Grievance
Soldiers' and Sailors
Relief Act of 1940
By L. A. HELLERSTEIN,
In DICTA, for the month of October, 1940, there appeared an
article relating to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1918 prepared
by the writer. As was noted in the previous article, the Act of 1918 was
revived, with certain exceptions, by the passage of the National Guard
Act approved August 27, 1940, and the Selective Training and Service
Act approved September 16, 1940. On October 7, 1940, Congress
replaced the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 19 18 as revived with a
new complete act which has now been approved by the president and is
known as "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940."
The act of 1940 reenacts the 1918 act, amending certain sections
and making some changes. In this article an attempt will be made to
point out the important changes and amendments.
It is to be noted that the 1940 act broadens the scope of the act to
.not only those selected under the Selective Training and Service Act
and to those persons included in the National Guard Act, but now
becomes applicable to members of the U. S. army, the navy, the military
corps, the coast guard, and all officers of the Public Health Service detailed
by proper authority for duty either with the army or the navy. A
change is also made as to definitions of "military service," "period of
military service," and persons affected. These changes which should be
noted are contained in Section 101 of the 1940 act which is as follows:
(1) The term 'persons in military service' and the term
persons in the military service of the United States,' as used in this
act, shall include the following persons and no others: All mem-
bers of the army of the United States, the United States navy, the
marine corps, the coast guard, and all officers of the Public Health
Service detailed by proper authority for duty either with the army
or the navy. The term 'military service' as used in this act, shall
signify federal service on active duty with any branch of service
heretofore referred to or mentioned as well as training or education
under the supervision of the United States preliminary to induction
into the military service. The terms 'active service' or 'active duty'
shall include the period during which a person in military service
*Of the Denver Bar.
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is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds. leave, or other
lawful cause.
(2) The term 'period of military service, as used in this
act, shall include the time between the following dates: For persons
in active service at the date of the approval of this act it shall begin
with the date of approval of this act: for persons entering active
service after the date of this act. with the date of entering active
service. It shall terminate with the date of discharge from active
service or death while in active service. but in no case later than
the date when this act ceases to be in force.
(3) The term 'person,' when used in this act with reference
to the holder of any right alleged to exist against a person in mili-
tary service or against a person secondarily liable under such right.
shall include individuals, partnerships, corporations, and any other
forms of business association.
(4) The term 'court.' as used in this act, shall include any
court of competent jurisdiction of the United States or of any state.
whether or not a court of record."
A change should be noted with reference to eviction for non-pay-
ment of rent. In the 1918 act, as to premises used chiefly for dwelling
purposes, the wife, children or other dependents of a person in military
service could not be evicted without a court order if the agreed rental was
$50.00 or less. Under the 1940 act the agreed rent per month is raised
to $80.00 per month.
Concerning installment contracts a proviso has been added in the
act which permits the modification, termination, or cancellation of any
such contract, or the repossession or retention of property purchased or
received under contract, by a mutual written agreement of the parties
thereto executed subsequent to the making of such contract and during
or after the period of military service of the person concerned.
The result of the above is that a person in military service may in
writing agree with the holder of an installment contract to terminate
the agreement or work out an amicable arrangement satisfactory to both
parties.
Concerning mortgages. trust deeds, and securities, the 1940 act
also provides that only obligations originating prior to the date of the
approval of the act are affected. This means then that obligations
originating subsequent to the approval of the 1940 act secured by mort-
gages, deeds of trust or other securities in the nature of a mortgage upon
real or personal property are not affected. Section 302 of the act i'
very specific concerning this proposition. However, there has now beer
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inserted in Section 302 of the act which relates to mortgages, trust deeds
and securities an exception and proviso which appears to be applicable
specifically to repossession of motor vehicles, tractors, or accessories. Sec-
tion 303 of the act is one of the important changes in the 1940 act
which should be given special attention. Section 303 of the act is as
follows:
"No court shall stay a proceeding to resume possession of a
motor vehicle, tractor, or the accessories of either, or for an order
of sale thereof, where said motor vehicle, tractor, or accessories are
encumbered by a purchase money mortgage, conditional sales con-
tract, or a lease or bailment with a view to purchase, unless the
court shall find that 50 per centum or more of the purchase price
of said property has been paid, but in any such proceeding the court
may, before entering an order or judgment, require the plaintiff
to file a bond, approved by the court, conditioned to indemnify the
defendant, if in military service, against any loss or damage that
he may suffer by reason of any such judgment or order should the
judgment or order be set aside in whole or in part."
The 1940 act also now contains provisions relating to protection
of those in military service upon their life insurance policies or those
entitled to benefits in the nature of life insurance arising out of member-
ship in any fraternal or benefit association. The availability of the
benefits of the act are set out in Section 402 of the act reading as follows:
"That the benefits of this act shall be available to any person
in military service in respect of contracts of insurance in force under
their terms up to but not exceeding a face value of $5,000, irre-
spective of the number of policies held by such person whether in
one or more companies, when -such contracts were made and a
premium was paid thereon before the date of approval of this act
or not less than thirty days before entry into the military service;
but in no event shall the provisions of this article apply to any
policy on which premiums are due and unpaid for a period of more
than one year at the time when application for the benefits of this
article is made or in respect of any policy on which there is out-
standing a policy loan or other indebtedness equal to or greater
than 50 per centum of the cash surrender value of the policy."
Under the terms of Section 405 of the act, policies do not lapse
during military service. The provisions of Section 405 are as follows:
"No policy which has not lapsed for the nonpayment of
premium before the commencement of the period of military service
of the insured, and which has been brought withi,n the benefits of
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this article, shall lapse or be forfeited for the nonpayment of pre-
mium during the period of such service or during one year after the
expiration of such period: Provided, That in no case shall this
prohibition extend for more than one year after the date when this
act ceases to be in force."
The provisions of the act concerning life insurance provide for
regulations to be prescribed by the administrator of veterans' affairs, a
report by the insurance companies to the Veterans' Administration of
those who have applied for benefits under the act, the issuance by the
administrator of veterans' affairs of a certificate signed by the admin-
istrator in the name of the United States payable to the insurer for an
amount of the difference between the total amount of defaulted premiums
and premiums paid for those in service. The certificates are to bear such
interest as may be prescribed by the secretary of the treasury. The
United States is granted a lien upon the policy, subject to any existing
lien, to indemnify it against loss. In the event of the death of a person
in military service, the amount of the certificate is to be deducted from
the proceeds of the policy and shown in the report of the insurer. The
act also sets up details as to settlement between the insurer and the
United States and the method of how same shall be handled by the
administrator of veterans' affairs and the treasurer of the United States.
The act also provides that it does not apply in respect to life insurance to
any policy which is void or which may at the option of the insured be
voidable if the insured is in military service. It also provides that it
applies only to insurance companies or associations which are required by
law to maintain a reserve, or which, if not so required, have made or
make provision for the collection from those insured of a premium to
cover specific war risks.
Article 5 of the 1940 act relates to taxes and public lands. Gen-
erally, concerning taxes, Section 500 (1) restricts its provisions, as
therein set out, as follows:
" (I) The provisions of this section shall apply when any
taxes or assessments, whether general or special, falling due during
the period of military service in respect of real property owned and
occupied for dwelling, agricultural, or business purposes by a per-
son in military service or his dependents at the commencement of
his period of military service and still so occupied by his dependents
or employees are not paid."
Under the act a burden of proof is placed upon a person in military
.ervice or someone upon his behalf to file with the collector of taxes, or
the proper officer, an affidavit in effect showing the tax assessment and
that the same is unpaid and that by reason of such military service, the
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ability to pay is materially affected. Thereupon no sale of the property
can be made to enforce collection, except upon leave of court granted
to the collector or officer. The court is authorized to stay such pro-
ceedings or sale for a period of not more than six months after the
termination of the period of military service. When such property is
sold, the person in military service is given the right to redeem or com-
mence an action to redeem within six months after the termination of
such service. When a tax or assessment is due and unpaid, the act fixes
an interest rate of 6 per cent per annum and provides that "no other
penalty or interest shall be incurred by reason of such non-payment.
Concerning public lands--Section 501 (1) provides as follows:
"(I) No right to any lands owned or controlled by the
United States initiated or acquired under any laws of the United
States, including the mining and mineral leasing laws, by any
person prior to entering military service shall during the period of
such service be forfeited or prejudiced by reason of his absence from
the land or his failure to perform any work or make any improve-
ments thereon or his failure to do any other act required by or
under such laws."
Concerning homestead entries, desert land entries, mining claims,
tnermits under mineral leasing laws, the act gives protection against for-
feiture during the period of military service of such person and for a
oeriod of six months thereafter. The secretary of the interior is author-
ized in his discretion to suspend provisions of the Reclamation Act dur-
ing the period of military service or upon other conditions.
Section 513 of the act provides that collection of income tax from
a person in military service shall be deferred for a period not more than
six months after termination of such service. Where income tax is
deferred no interest may be collected by reason of such non-payment.
An exception is provided in this section which states that it does not
apply to income tax on employees imposed by Section 1400 of the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act.
In the foregoing it has been attempted briefly to survey the terms
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940 and point out. some of
its provisions so that reference thereto may be made by those interested
in the subject matter. These pages do not permit greater detail. Gen-
erally, it accomplishes its purpose of granting benefits to those in military
service so as to leave them free to devote their time and energies in the
service of our country.
An Anomalous
Tax Situation
By ALBERT J. GOULD*
A rather anomalous situation has arisen in Colorado with reference
to liability of small corporations in connection with the Unemployment
Compensation Act.
I,n Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court on July 1, 1940, 104 Pac. 2d 897, the opinion, written
by Mr. Justice Knous, holds that non-compensated officers of corpora-
tions are not to be included in ascertaining whether the corporation is
subject to the Colorado Unemployment Compensation Act.
This act provides that each employer who employs eight or more
employes on any part of any day during each of twenty weeks in any
calendar year shall be subject to the act and shall be required to pay to
the Colorado Unemployment Compensation Fund unemployment com-
pensation benefits aggregating 2.7 per cent of the employe's wages.
The federal act provides for the payment to the federal government
of 3 per cent of such employe's wages, but allows the employer a credit
of 90 per cent thereof (or 2.7 per cent of said wages) in the event said
amount theretofore has been paid to the state. The result is that the
employer pays 2.7 per cent of the employe's wages to the state and
receives a credit in that amount upon the 3 per cent due the federal
government, and thus pays the federal government .3 of 1 per cent of
the employe's wages, after and if the amount due the state has been paid.
The difficulty in this matter has arisen in determining whether the
word "employe" includes non-salaried officers of corporations with few
employes which would not be subject to the act except for the inclusion
of non-salaried officers as employes.
There are many corporations in this state which would be subject
to the act if non-salaried officers are to be counted as employes, whereas
these corporations would not be subject to the act if non-salaried officers
are not to be counted as employes.
The conflict between the Colorado Supreme Court interpretation
of the Colorado act and the fedral act and regulations thereunder is
illustrated by the following:
*Of the Denver Bar. Hereafter Mr. Gould will comment monthly in DICTA on
new developments in the law of taxation.
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Section 19 (g) (I) of the Colorado act provides "Employment
* * * means service * * * performed for wages or under any
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied."
Section 19 (f) (7) of the Colorado act provides that "employer"
means "(7) any employing unit which becomes an employer subject
to the provisions of Title IX of the Social Security Act."
On February 4, 1939, the treasury. department issued Mimeograph
No. 4880, in explanation of said Title IX, which defined "employe"
as including an officer of a corporation unless he were an honorary officer.
Section 6 of the mimeograph then stated:
"An officer of a corporation is an 'honorary' officer within
the meaning of the foregoing rule if
(I) he is specifically designated an honorary officer;
(2) such designation is solely to do him honor or to have
him included in the organization because of his name, prominence
or standing in the community;
(3) it would not ordinarily be necessary to fill his office
should he die or resign:
(4) as such officer, he does not actually perform any service
and is not required or expected to perform any; and
(5) as such officer, he does not receive, and is not entitled to
receive, remuneration."
It is apparent, of course, from the foregoing definition of honorary
officer that practically every officer of any type of business corporation,
regardless of compensation, must be considered an employe within the
meaning of Title IX of the Federal Social Security Act, if that act applies
in the interpretation of "employe" in the Colorado act.
In the Brannaman case, the Supreme Court said:
"As has been pointed out our act contains one definition of
'employment,' 19 (g) (1), supra, while Title IX of the federal
law, 42 U. S. C. A., pp. 1101 et seq., contains an entirely different
and distinct definition of the same term. PP. 1607 (c), Title 26,
U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Code. We cannot conceive that in adopting
section 19 (f) (7) the General Assembly contemplated that the
fundamental express definitions of the state act, which has an




The Colorado Supreme Court having held that Title IX of the
Federal Social Security Act does not apply in the interpretation of the
word "employe" in the Colorado Act, and that non-compensated officers
are not to be counted as employes, it would seem to follow that Colorado
employers of a total of less than eight compensated officers and employes
need not comply with the Colorado act.
An anomalous situation has arisen, however, from the fact that
the federal government now has taken the position that because the
fdral act requires the full payment of 3 per cent of the wages of
em-)loyees as defined by the federal act, unless the employer prior thereto
ha,; naid 90 per cent thereof to the state agency, the Colorado employer
i; bound by the definition of employes in the federal act and will be
required to pay the full 3 per cent of the wages of his employes to the
f'deral government, unless theretofore he has paid 90 per cent thereof
to the state, and that the question of the liability of the employer to the
state under a Colorado interpretation of the Colorado act is immaterial.
The effect of the government's position is to nullify the practical
benefit of the Supreme Court decision referred to above.
As a possible means of avoiding this anomalous situation, we sub-
mit trh following queries: May the Colorado employer not subject to
thp Co'orado act under this decision pay the Colorado tax under protest
,-,nd having obtained his receipt therefor. then pay the federal tax less
tile amount paid the state, and having obtained the federal receipt, then
sue for a refund of the Colorado tax and, second, if th e Colorado
emoloyer succeeds in obtaining a refund after having paid the federal
government, has the federal government then any right to impose
penalties and collect the amount refunded to the Colorado employer by
the Colorado Unemployment Compensation Fund?
The purpose of the unemployment compensation acts being to pro-
v;de benefits for employes when they are out of employment, why should
payment be made by an employer for a non-compensated officer who
will not be entitled to any benefits under the act when he is not
employed? The federal act recognizes that directors are not to be
counted as officers, and it would seem to be apparent that non-com-
pensated officers likewise should not be counted.
We anticipate the federal courts will bold that the mimeograph
above mentioned is beyond the terms of the statute and will follow the
Colorado interpretation.
The matter should be tested as soon as possible.
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New Rules Affecting Property
Rights Adopted by
State Supreme Court
In order to facilitate compliance with Section 302 (3) of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, the Supreme Court of
Colorado, acting on advice of the Code Revision Committee of the state
bar, promulgated a new rule on October 28, 1940. The new rule
became effective November I, 1940. It will be Rule 120 of the Revised
Code if the rules now being considered by the Supreme Court are
adopted.
The Code Revision Committee sent to the Supreme Court the third
draft of the rules the first of November with the resolution adopted by
the state bar recommending that the court promulgate the new rules of
procedure. Indications are that the court will hold a conference of the
judges of the county and district courts to discuss the rules, and that
adoption of the draft will probably follow about the first of the year,
coming into effect in the spring of 1941.
The new rule pertaining to the military service provisions follows:
RULE 120. ORDERS AUTHORIZING SALES UNDFR POWERS
(a) Motion and Notice. Whenever by law an order of court is
required authorizing a sale under a power of sale contained in an instru-
ment, any interested person may file a motion verified by the oath of
such person or of someone in his behalf, in any court of record asking
for such order; such motion shall describe the instrument containing
the power and the property sought to be sold thereunder and shall state
the names of the persons having any interest in such property and shall
state the address of each such person or shall state that his address is
unknown. The court shall by order fix a time and place for the hearing
of such motion. The clerk shall issue a notice containing a description
of the instrument and of the property sought to be sold thereunder and
the time and place of the hearing and shall state that an order is asked
authorizing a sale of said property under such power of sale. Such
notice shall be served by the clerk mailing, not less than ten days before
the hearing, a copy thereof to each person stated in the motion as having
any interest in such property whose address is stated in such motion
and by the clerk posting, not less than ten days before the hearing, a copy
thereof in a prominent place in his office. Such mailing and posting shall
b, evidenced by the certificate of the clerk.
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(b) Sales of Real Estate. Provided, however, that when the
property to be sold is real estate and the power of sale is contained in
a deed of trust to a public trustee, the motion need state the names of
only those persons who have any record interest in such real estate and
the address of each such person as such address is given in the recorded
instrument of writing and copies of the notice need be mailed only to
each person so named in the motion whose address is so stated. If such
recorded instrument of writing does not give such address no copy of
the notice need be mailed to the particular person whose address is not
so given; provided, however, that where only the county and state is
given as the address of such person, then the copy of the notice shall be
mailed to the county seat of such county.
(c) Hearing and Order. No motions or pleadings shall be re-
quired or permitted to be filed by anyone other than the person who filed
the motion for the order authorizing the sale. At the time and place
set for the hearing or to which the hearing may be continued, the court
shall examine such affidavits as may have been filed and hear such testi-
mony as may be offered and shall then summarily determine the motion
and grant or deny said motion and enter an order accordingly. At any
time before the entry of such order the court may require such additional
notice to be given as it may see fit.
(d) Return of Sale. The court shall require a return of such sale
to be made to the court for its approval.
(e) Docket Fee. A docket fee of $5.00 shall be paid by the per-
son filing such motion.
This rule facilitates compliance with Sec. 302 (3) Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, reading as follows: "No sale under
a power of sale or under a judgment entered upon warrant of attorney
to confess judgment contained in any such obligation shall be valid if
made during the period of military service or within three months there-
after, unless upon an order of sale previously granted by the court and a
return thereto made and approved by the court."
In order to make for uniform procedure respecting other provisions
of the Civil Relief Act, the District Court of the First Judicial District
adopted the following rule which is now in effect:
"Before a default judgment is entered, the plaintiff shall file in the
court an affidavit setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not
in military service of the United States or, if unable to file such affidavit,
the plaintiff shall in lieu thereof file an affidavit setting forth either that
the defendant is in such military service or that plaintiff is not able to
determine whether or not defendant is in such service. Before entering
a default judgment the court shall appoint an attorney to represent any
and all defendants, in default, who are or may be in such military serv-
ice, and protect their interests. Such appointment shall be made upon
application of plaintiff, but if no such application be made the Court
shall make the appointment on its own motion. Provided, however,
no such appointment shall be made if it appears from the affidavit filed
by the plaintiff that the defaulting defendant is not in such military
service. The Court may, in its discretion, allow a fee to such attorney
not to exceed $10.00, to be taxed and paid by the plaintiff as a part of
his costs. This rule shall take effect as of November I, A. D. 1940."
Intolerable
Lawrence Sullivan in his recent book, The Dead Hand of Bureauc-
racy, states his conviction as follows: "To checlk the crippling influence
of runaway bureaucracy is our foremost problem; and upon its solution
depends the survival of the American way of life." (The Reader's
Digest,.October, 1940, p. 120.)
The latest manifestation of a reach for power by administrative
boards is the declaration of a system for the discipline and control of
attorneys representing private clients. A few months ago the Federal
Trade Commission promulgated a rule empowering a trial examiner
to suspend a hearing and recommend to the Commission for disbarment
from practice before it any attorney whom the examiner deemed guilty of
"disrepectful" language or conduct (vide supra, p. 165).
Now the New York State Labor Relations Board has followed suit
and issued a rule, effective September 16, 1940, empowering a trial
examiner to exclude from further participation in the proceeding any
attorney who, in the examiner's discretion, has been guilty of "con-
temptuous" conduct before him. In such an instance the hearing is to
be adjourned so as to afford the attorney's client opportunity to obtain
other counsel. A right of appeal to the board is granted to the aggrieved
attorney, but the determination of the board is final.
The above regulations pose the question whether a board, fre-
quently consisting of laymen, should ever have the power to sit in
judgment on the conduct of a lawyer, a sworn officer of the courts. in
defending his client's rights. It is well known that numerous admin-
istrative commissions are appointed under statutes of a social-economic
character, often of the most controversial nature. It is well known,
moreover, that those men who administer these statutes are frequently
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imbued with a mission and zeal seldom seen on the bench of any court.
Many of the members of these boards, being laymen, have never studied
judicial procedure, and are wholly unfamiliar with the history of the
common law and of the ancient and ceaseless struggle for the protection
of individual rights.
How often in the past has an intrepid member of the bar stood
boldly for his client's rights in the face of a hostile tribunal! How often
the vigorous and brave conduct of an attorney could be classed as "dis-
respectful" or "contemptuous" by an administrative zealot untrained in
the law and careless of the rights of the respondent'
Many years ago in England Mr. Justice Bayley, in speaking of the
privilege of counsel to speak strongly in court, held that, "The law pre-
sumes that he acts in discharge of his duty, and in pursuance of his
instructions, and allows him this privilege, because it is for the advantage
of the administration of justice that he should have free liberty of
speech." (Flint c:. Pihe. 4 Barn. and Cress. 478.)
Or take the instance when the great Sir Matthew Hale was threat-
ened by Cromwell's government for his vigorous defense of the Duke of
Hamilton and Lord Capel. Hale replied that he was pleading in support
of law, was performing his duty to his clients, and was not to be daunted
by any threats.
Or consider the occasion when Lord Ellenborough rebuked Mr.
Brougham for a fervid address in behalf of his clients charged with
libel. The judge rebuked Brougham for inoculating himself with the
virus of his client's libel. But Brougham replied: "My lord, why am
I thus identified with the interests of my client? I appear here as an
English advocate, with the privileges and responsibilities of that office;
and no man shall call in question my principles in the faithful and
honest discharge of my duty."
Recall to mind the episode at the close of the Dean of St. Asaph's
libel case when Erskine, then 34, stood his ground before Mr. Justice
Buller. The judge criticized the jury's verdict holding the defendant
"guilty of publishing only." and threatened to expunge the word
"only." Erskine turned to the jury and asked: "Is the word 'only' to
stand part of the verdict?" Juror: "Certainly." Erskine: "Then I
insist it shall be recorded." Buller, J.: "Then the verdict must be
misunderstood. Let me understand the jury." Erskine: "The jury do
understand their verdict." Buller, J.: "Sir, I will not be interrupted."
Frskine: "I stand here as an advocate for a brother citizen, and I desire
that the word 'only' may be recorded." Buller, J.: "Sit down, sir,
rem-mber your duty, or I shall be obliged to proceed in another man-
net." Erskine: "Your lordship may proceed in what manner you think
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fit. I know my duty as well as your lordship knows yours. I shall
not alter my conduct." (The word "only" was duly recorded.)
Some years after the above tilt with Mr. Justice Buller, Lord
Campbell wrote what he thought of the conduct of Erskine on that
occasion. He said: "This noble stand for the independence of the bar,
would, of itself, have entitled Erskine to the statue, which the profes-
sion affectionately erected to his memory, in Lincoln's Inn Hall. We are
to admire the decency and propriety of the demeanor, during the strug-
gle, no less than its spirited and the felicitous precision, with which he
meted out the requisite and justifiable portions of defiance. The example
has had a salutary effect, in illustrating and establishing the duties of
judge and advocate in England." (6 Lives of the Lord Chancellors,
415.)
Finally, let us not overlook the valiant Malasherbes, faithful to
the end as defender of his king. This great Frenchman was unafraid
to face even the dread Convention howling for their monarch's head.
Malasherbes as advocate for Louis pleaded his client's hopeless cause,
and was content to go to the guillotine for performing his duty.
The long story of the struggle of the lawyer to protect his client
even in a court before a judge trained in the law would indicate the
danger today of placing like powers of discipline in the hands of laymen
appointed to administer the social-economic statutes now on the books.
Many a lawyer specializes in the law administered by one of these boards.
Is he to have his livelihood in constant jeopardy at the hands of these
men? Is he to stand craven before these commissions for fear that
some bureaucrat will think him "disrepectful?"
The situation calls for instant remedy. These rules must be
abrogated and none others like them ever issued.
The words of the famous Wisconsin lawyer, Edward G. Ryan, in
the impeachment trial of Judge Levi Hubbell, are apposite here. He
was speaking of the spirit of the bar. "Touch its independence," he
cried, "and it rebels to a man, shoulder to shoulder, standing up against
the invasion of its rights. A corrupt judge may disorganize it; but a
tyrannical court can neither bend it nor break it. The relation of a
lawyer to his client is a peculiar and important one. Life, character,
liberty, prosperity, all that is dear and sacred in life, are the trust of the
client to his lawyer. The world may assail: the world may persecute:
death and ruin may overhang: all men may desert, but the unfortunate
is ever secure in the zeal and loyalty of his advocate."
If in some rare instance a lawyer is really guilty of unprofessional
conduct before some quasi-judicial board, the remedy is not in such rules
as described above but in some bill similar to that recently prepared
by the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association and submitted to the House of Delegates of such association
at its meeting last month in Philadelphia. That bill provides that
whenever an administrative agency believes that a member of the bar
has conducted himself in practice before it in a manner violative of
recognized standards of professional ethics or conduct, such agency may
bring the matter to the attention of the attorney general. If the attorney
general finds reasonable grounds to believe such charge is true, he is
required to file a proceeding against the member of the bar in the district
court of the district where the latter resides, for the purpose of securing
his suspension or disbarment. Such proceeding is to be conducted by the
court in the same manner as other disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys. -N. Y. State Bar Service Letuer.
THE LEGALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
From recent case rulings it is apparent that certain rules and regula-
tions promulgated by administrative departments are being sanctioned as
law. The situation arises where a particular statute, or some section of
it, has received an official, departmental interpretation as to meaning or
applicability i.n connection with specific matters. Thenceforth, the con-
struction placed upon the statute, in the form of an administrative ruling,
is entitled to the same respect as a legislative enactment, unless or until
a subsequent legislature takes affirmative action upon it.
In Bedford v. Colorado Fuel &3 Iron, 102 Colo. 538, 81 P. (2d)
752, (1938) was called to determine whether sales of certain tangible
personal property were exempted under the Sales Tax Act, Ch. 230, S. L.
1937. Nearly two years before the case was decided the state treasurer
had ruled that certain specific sales were taxable under Sec. 2 (n) . In the
meantime the legislature had re-enacted the sales tax law, making no
change in the latter section. In its opinion the court said that "the legis-
lature was presumptively aware of the construction theretofore given the
previous statutes, and was satisfied therewith." It was stated further that
''the re-enactment of the sales tax law, after rules of construction pro-
mulgated by the state treasurer had been in force for almost two years.
in effect, amounted to a legislative confirmation of those rules."
Again in First National Bank of Greeley, Colo. v. United States. 86
Fed. (2d) 938, in a contest over the effect of an administrative ruling on
requirements of capital stock tax returns, the Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that "repeated congressional revision of income tax statutes with
knowledge of treasury regulations relating to taxation of income from
sales of corporate property by liquidating receivers of trustees ...is such
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direct and convincing proof of legislative approval of regulation that it
should not be overturned by the courts . .. unless clearly inconsistent
with the statute."
The United States Supreme Court has also recently affirmed this
proposition in Haggar v. Heloering, 60 S Ct. 337, 308 U. S. 389, by
stating that "Congress by re-enacting a section of a revenue act without
change, approves and adopts a consistent administrative construction
of it."
We submit the foregoing primarily to encourage the response of
Association members as to the advisability of DICTA furnishing a brief
resume each month of the more important administrative rulings.
FRED E. NEEF Reports the
Current Events of
Bench and Bar
Plan for Court Trial of Judges
Armed with the approval of the American Bar Association. Chair-
man Hatton W. Sumners of the House judiciary committee is laying
plans to get action, as soon as the new congress meets, on his bill to pro-
vide for court trial of federal judges on the question of good behavior.
New Ground for Divorce Urged by Vermont Bar
Vermont divorce law liberalization through new grounds which
would include living apart for three consecutive years by mutual consent
was advocated by the Vermont Bar Association at its annual meeting.
The recommendation to increase divorce grounds, which was
adopted and referred to the association's legislative committee for pres-
entation to the legislature, provided that divorce should be granted
"when a married person has lived apart from his or her spouse for three
consecutive years without fault on the part of the libellant and the court
finds that a resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable."
Lawyers Pledge Fight on Nazi-Red Groups
The Lawyers Club of Los Angeles will continue its fight against
elements in the legal profession that are hostile to the American form of
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government, notwithstanding the California State Bar rejected a resolu-
tion calling for the disbarment of attorneys holding membership in
Communist, Fascist or Nazi organizations, according to Jay Moidel,
chairman of the Club's public relations committee.
The resolution presented to the State Bar demanded disbarment of
lawyers who "directly or indirectly assist in movements designed to
overthrow our present form of government.
Legal Aid for Soldiers Is Asked From Bar
Major General Clifford R. Powell, commander of the 44th Divi-
sion. has appealed to the State Bar Associations of New York and New
Jersey to provide free legal aid for soldiers who have become involved in
litigation for nonpayment of obligations incurred before they were called
to active duty.
Lawyers Taught Legal Side of Military Buying
The government is looking to the legal profession to open up one
of the worst bottlenecks in the entire defense program-the legal techni-
calities in connection with purchasing.
To meet the problem the Army Industrial College, under the direc-
tion of Assistant Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, is emphasizing
the need of training lawyers to handle those special problems in connec-
tion with army and navy procurement.
Therefore, both the army and the navy have been calling in reserve
officers who are lawyers and giving them training for four months in
handling legal phases of defense program buying.
Young Lawyers to Be Hit Hard By Draft
Lawyers between the ages of 21 and 36 who are without depend-
ents and physically fit have unusually good prospects of becoming fed-
eral employes via the conscription route, according to the joint commit-
tee on selective service.
The legal profession stands far down the list of employments re-
garded as essential to the national defense, and while some lawyers may
claim exemption by reason of connection with a defense industry, most
members of the Bar will be looked upon as in a class that can be drafted
without much dislocation to vital industries. For this reason the per-
centage drafted will probably be higher in the case of lawyers than with
followers of other callings.
Drastic ReVision of Insurance Laws Advocated
Drastic revision of state and federal laws to permit insurance com-
panies to operate more efficiently was advocated before the American Bar
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Association's insurance law section by Benjamin Rush, Philadelphia,
who declared that the blame for present high insurance rates is to be
ascribed to legislation unduly restricting insurance company investments.
limiting the scope of risks authorized and the taxing of profits, incomes
and inheritances.
Julius Gunter, Former State Bar Association President, Dies
Julius Gunter died at his home in Denver on October 26, 1940.
Mr. Gunter, who was a former president of the Colorado Bar Associ-
ation, was stricken by a sudden heart attack in front of his home in Den-
ver and died within a few minutes after the attack.
He was born in Fayetteville, Arkansas, on October 31, 1858. His
father was a colonel in the Confederate army and a congressman
from Arkansas from 1874-84.
Mr. Gunter attended the University of Virginia and was admitted
to practice in Colorado in 1881. He began to practice law in this state
at Trinidad. In 1888 he was elected as judge of the third judicial
district, and in 1901 he was appointed to the Court of Appeals. He was
elected to the state supreme court in 1904 and as Governor in 1916.
While a justice of the Supreme Court he was selected as president of
the state bar in 1907.
After completing his term as governor, he resumed the private prac-
tice of law. He acted for some time as a director of the First National
Bank of Denver and of the International Trust company.
He also served as president of the board of trustees of Clayton Col-
lege and of the Tillotson Academy in Trinidad. He received the hon-
orary degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of Colorado and
acted as a regent of that university.
On October 30, 1884, he married Bettie Brown of Trinidad, who
died nearly six years ago. No children were born to the Gunters.
Funeral services were held in St. Barnabas Episcopal Church of
which he was a member, and interment was at Fairmount cemetery.
Jacob Fillius, Father of Park System, Is Dead
Jacob Fillius, 93, died in Mercy hospital in Denver of a heart at-
tack on October 7, 1940.
For nearly half a century, Mr. Fillius, after whom Fillius park was
named, played important roles in the development of Colorado and Den-
ver, both in his private work as an attorney and in his public service.
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Mr. Fillius was born in Hudson, Ohio, and received his early edu-
cation there. After his graduation from Western Reserve college, be dc-
cided to seek his fortune in the West. In 1873 he settled in Georgetown.
a booming silver mining town where he became a teacher. Later he gave
up teaching and studied for the bar. In 1878 he was admitted to the
Colorado bar. He was given a partnership in the office of Senator Wol-
cott and became a leading attorney in Georgetown. He was mayor of
Georgetown several times.
In 1893, he and his wife moved to Denver. His interest in civic
affairs was manifested shortly after he established his home in Denver.
He was president of the board of supervisors, forerunner of the city coun-
cil, from 1900 to 1902. In 1902 he was a member of the commission
which drafted Denver's city charter. In 1904 Mayor Speer appointed
him president of the Denver park board, in which capacity he conceived
and promoted many of the features of the Denver mountain and munic-
ipal park systems. In 19 13 he retired from public life to devote all of
his time to his law practice. He was active in that practice until 1925.
He was a member of the Denver and Colorado bar associations, the
Denver club, the Georgetown lodge, A. F. and A. M.. and the First-
Plymouth Congregational church. He was also a director of the Ameri-
can National Bank.
Harry C. Riddle Dies of Stroke
Harry Carson Riddle, who had been practicing in Denver for fifty-
nine years, suffered a heart attack while playing golf and died on October
29, 1940, without recovering from its effects.
Mr. Riddle was born in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, on February 4,
1869, and received his elementary education in the east. He came to
Denver in 1881 and studied law in Colorado, being admitted to the bar
in 1896. He was elected to the district judgeship for the First Judicial
District and served for one term. In 1922, he and S. Harrison White
were appointed by Judge Charles Butler to prosecute the bunco ring.
He was active in civic affairs, serving on the city council as a repre-
sentative from the Park Hill district, and was one of the persons who
drew up the present charter for the City of Denver. He was a prominent
member of the Anti-saloon League and of the Presbyterian church.
For many years he served as the president of the Westminster Uni-
versity Association which operates the Westminster law school, and he
was an instructor in that school for a considerable period of time.
He is survived by his wife. a son, and two daughters. Funeral
services were held at Montview Presbyterian church on November Ist.
No. 14594. Estates; Power of County Court to Order Audit.
Dunklee, etc. v. Countu Court of Denver, et al. Decided April 8, 1940.
District Court, Denver. Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge. Affirmed.
En Banc.
FACTS: A question raised as to whether, i.n the matter of the
Estate of George W. Clayton, deceased, the Denver County Court had
jurisdiction to order a general audit of accounts of the Clayton College
Trustees and Clayton Trust Commission.
HELD: 1. "Where a testator so directs, or such intent is ap-
parent from his will, the cou.nty court, under its original jurisdiction
in probate matters conferred by Section 23, Article VI of the Constitu-
tion and the terms of Section 227, Chapter 176, '35 C.S'.A., properly
may continue to supervise the administration of a testamentary trust
created by such will to the extent commanded thereby, notwithstand-
ing the debts of the estate and the legacies fixed by the will have been
paid in full and the executors discharged."
2. It is the opinion of the court that the express provisions of
the Clayton will manifestly demand the application of the above rule
to the situation under consideration.
3. Although said Section 227 was adopted in 1903, one year
after the alleged effective date of the discharge of the executor, the estate
proper was in the process of administration until the entry of a 1905
decree, and thereafter until the executor filed in the County Court his
receipt as trustee.
4. It would seem certain that even if the said Section 227 were
given retroactive effect, it being purely remedial and procedural in
character, no contract or vested right would be violated.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Jus-
tice Bock dissent.
No. 14663. Estates: Claim Against Estate Based Upon Oral
Statements of Decedent: Evidence: Consideration: Witness. Parker V.
Hilliard, Jr., etc. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court, Denver.
Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge. Affirmed. In Dept.
HELD: 1. Testimony in support of a claim against an estate,
consisting entirely of a recital of alleged oral statements of deceased
against his interest, is the weakest of evidence.
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2. Evidence to support a claim against an estate should be clear
and convincing as to its existence as well as to the amount of the claim.
3. It may be questioned whether past services when rendered
under circumstances which create no legal liability, constitute consider-
ation for a subsequent promise.
4. Where the incompetency of a witness is only partial, an objec-
tion on that ground should not be entertained until he is asked to testify
to those matters as to which he is incapacitated.
5. " 'Where a witness which a party tenders is compete.nt as to
certain facts, but not as a general witness, and he is objected to as in-
competent,-the party tendering him should state what he proposes to
prove by him, so that the court may know that it is proper; otherwise
an appellate court can not say that there is any error in refusing to
allow him to testify.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice
Burke concur.
No. 14540. Criminal Law; Probation; Constitutional Law.
People v. District Court. Decided April 8, 1940. In re Probation
of Siraguso. Original Proceedings. Writ of Mandamus ordered
issued. En Banc.
HELD: 1. A district judge may not grant probation to con-
victed defendant over objection of district attorney.
2. Chapter 140, Section 1, '35 C.S.A. (S.L. 1931, Chapter 136,
Section 1) providing that the judge of any district court, may, in cer-
tain instances "with approval of the district attorney" grant probation
in certain cases, is constitutional.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Bock dissents. Mr.
Justice Burke concurs in the conclusion and Mr. Chief Justice Hillard
not participating.
No. 14748. Wills; Incompetency. In re Estate of McCrone.
Decided April 8, 1940. County Court, Denver. Hon. Henry Bruce
Teller, Judge. Reversed. In Dept.
HELD: 1. Although a testator, at the time of executing his
will had previously been found incompetent, and the court had ap-
pointed for him and his estate a conservator, and although such ap-
pointment was in force at the date of execution of the will, it is possible
that the testator may have recovered and have bee~n of sound mind and
memory.
2. Where caveator alleges facts of incompetency and appoint-
ment of conservator, and proponent answers alleging that testator was
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mentally competent at time of making will, such defense, if proved.
would be good and it was error for the trial court to sustai.n a demurrer
to the answer.
3. The appointment of a conservator is not conclusive.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
No. 14315. Insurance; Suit for Recovery of Money: Right to
,Jury Trial: Cross-Examination. Kansas City Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Lathrop. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court. Denver.
Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. Where suit is based upon an insurance policy pro-
vision for recovery of money, it is an action at law and it was error for
the trial court to refuse a trial by jury.
2. Where suit is based upon claim for disability and defense is
to effect that $3500.00 was paid to plaintiff in full settlement it was
error for trial court to sustain objection to following question put to
plaintiff on cross-examination: "Now, Mr. Lathrop, at that time what
did you understand this $3500.00 was being paid to you for?"
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
No. 14749. Equity: Fraud. Scott v. McClain. Decided April
8. 1940. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry S. Lindsley. Judge.
Affirmed. In Dept.
FACTS: A. Plaintiff brought suit on grounds of fraud against
defendants alleging certain fraudulent representations as to a lease and
that defendants failed to put lease in good standing thereby causing
plaintiff to lose his interest.
B. Defendants claim that plaintiff failed to offer to do equity
by restoring them to substantially the same position which they occu-
pied previously.
HELD: I. The trial court correctly found for plaintiff, and
demurrers of defendants to complaint were properly overruled because
it appears that the lease was lost through the fault and neglect of de-
fendants, and that plaintiffs could, therefore, not restore the lease to
the defendants.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur.
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No. 14588. Notes; Statute of Limitations. District Land-
owners Trust u. Bengston. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court,
Denuer. Hon. George F. Dunhlee, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
HELD: I. Defense of statute of limitations against a suit on
a note held to be good where it appears that more than six years elapsed
after last payment.
2. On conflicting evidence trial court held against plaintiff's
contention that defendants were estopped to raise question of statute
of limitations, and appellate court will not disturb trial court's finding.
3. Case, under statute, not to be taken out of rule of statute of
limitations unless alleged new promise or acknowledgment is in writing.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Jus-
tice Burke dissent.
No. 14605. Sanitary Sewer District Bonds; Failure of Town
Treasurer to Pay in Numerical Order; Parties. Wanguild v. Town of
Haxtun. Decided April 8, 1940. District Court, Phillips County.
Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
FACTS: Suit brought against town for tortious failure of its
agent to comply with plain provisions of the law relative to the dis-
bursement of trust funds coming into his hands by virtue of his office.
The town treasurer failed to redeem sanitary sewer district bonds in
their numerical order.
HELD: 1. Colorado has no statute limiting the liability of
municipalities for its agents' tortious acts in failing to comply with the
statute requiring payment of trust funds in a specific manner, and there-
fore, such suit may be maintained.
2. In such case the town treasurer need not be made a party.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Domestic Relations: Custody of Minor Child; Conflict of Laws;
Juvenile Courts; Habeas Corpus; Jurisdiction. No. 14759. De-
cided June 17,. 1940. Snyder v. Schmoyer. District Court,
Denver. Hon. Floyd F. Miles, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACTS: A. Father sought and obtained writ of habeas corpus
awarding him custody of minor child. The petition for the writ was
based largely on a judgment rendered by Montana Court, after a full
hearing on petition by mother, determining that each parent should
have the child six months of each year until child is of school age.
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B. The mother had custody of child first and brought the child
to Denver and refused to surrender him to the father at the end of her
six months' period.
C. The mother, anticipating action by the father, filed a "peti-
tion in dependency" in the Denver Juvenile Court. This petition was
prepared and acknowledged before, but, according to filing stamp, was
not filed until the same day that father filed his petition in District
Court.
HELD: 1. The district court has jurisdiction in some cases
under habeas corpus to determine the matter of the custody of minor
children in counties having a population of over 100,000 (Denver).
2. The fact that exclusive jurisdiction has bee,n given to the
Denver Juvenile Court in matters concerning the custody of minor
children generally does not deprive the district court of its jurisdiction,
unless the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is properly invoked or
available.
3. Estoppel by judgment is available against the mother since
it is not reasonable to believe that there could have been any such
changed conditions subsequent to decree of the Montana Court as
would justify a re-litigation of the facts already determined by that
court.
4. Parties are bound by judgments rendered by courts of com-
petent jurisdiction, whether they expressly agree to that judgment or
not; an express agreement that a particular judgment should be ren-
dered gives to that judgment no peculiar character and renders it no
more sacred than the ordinary judgment.
5. Parties who have voluntarily submitted their controversy to
a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be allowed to
question its authority.
6. Every possible controversy arising concerning the custody
of the child does not ipso facto give the juvenile court jurisdiction.
The juvenile court was without jurisdiction to proceed with any action
on the ground of dependency in this case, for there was involved no
new "controversy," as the word is used in the statute.
7. The mother alleges that the father will take the child to
Canada and there keep it away from her. It is hardly proper for a
Colorado tribunal to adjudicate a possible contempt matter arising in
the court of another state.
8. While the language of the statute giving the juvenile court
jurisdiction in cases of dependency states that the jurisdiction of district
courts to dispose of questions of custody of children in divorce cases
shall not "interfere with the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in cases
concerning the dependency of such children," such language shall be
construed as meaning dependency in fact and not a fictitious condition.
9. It is not the law that both the child and its custodians may
be dragged from court to court and subjected to a ceaseless round of
discomfort and litigation at the whim of the petitioner.
10. The decree of the Montana court states that it is (and in
fact it is) for the best interests of the child to spend part of its time
in the city and part on a ranch.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock concurs in the
result. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Young dissent.
XVater Rights; Conditional Decrees. No. 14474. Decided June 17,
1940. Taussig, et al. v. Moffat Tunnel Water and Deuelopment
Company. District Court, Grand County. Hon. Charles E.
Herrick, Judge. Decrees modified and, as modified, affirmed. En
Banc.
HELD: 1. Conditional decrees concerning water rights were
granted by our courts prior to statutory authority. In 1919, the legis-
lature gave statutory authority for such conditional decrees and provided
for certain procedure.
2. Construing Section 195 of Chapter 90, 1935 C. S. A., it is
held that a court may enter a conditional decree before the diversion and
application of water to a beneficial use have been wholly or partially
completed.
3. " 'Although the appropriation is not deemed complete until
the actual diversion or use of the water, still if such work be prosecuted
with reasonable diligence, the right relates to the time when the first
step was taken to secure it.' "
4. In effect, to require the water company to complete its project
before granting it any decree would constitute a denial of the consti-
tutional right to divert waters to a beneficial use.
5. It is not an unusual practice in acquiring a decree that the
first step be the making of a survey of the project.
6. Under Section 195, where a conditional decree is granted, the
court retains supervisory jurisdiction of the question of reasonable dili-
gence and the bona fides of petitioners for conditional decrees.
7. Where only conditional decrees are involved, it is immaterial
that the claim statement omits the number of acres of land lying under
the proposed project, although before final decree the claim statement
must be completed.
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8. Where conditional decrees are involved, it is not necessary
that the appropriation be for specific water and for a designated and
definite purpose. However, the maximum amount of the water to be
diverted must be stated.
9. The evidence must show a definite proposed use, even for a
conditional decree. It is not good practice to predicate a beneficial use
in a conditional or final decree "for beneficial purposes other than irriga-
tion." The language is too indefinite. Some uses have preferences over
others and should be specifically stated, even in a conditional decree.
The decrees should be modified to show that they relate only to irriga-
tion, domestic and municipal uses.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not
participating.
Damages: Exemplary: Verdict; Costs. No. 14760. Decided June
10, 1940. Liuingston v. Utah.Colorado Land and Livestock
Co. District Court, Moffat County. Hon. Charles E. Herrich.
Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. It is the general rule that exemplary damages are
not recoverable in the absence of proof of actual damages. Upon the
question of whether it is essential that the money extent of the actual
damages must be found as a predicate to an award of punitive damages,
the authorities are in conflict.
2. Colorado follows the rule that where actual damages occur,
although not determined in money value, punitive damages will be
upheld.
3. But where a jury expressly finds no actual damages, it may
not award punitive damages.
4. The recommendation of the jury that both parties pay their
own costs is improper and not binding on the court.
5. The taxing of costs as to the branch of the case resolved in
favor of the plaintiff was discretionary with the trial court, and under
the facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not
participating.
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A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
The following excerpe is taken from an address
before a meeting of the American Bankers Associ-
ation by Mr. John H. Freeman of the law firm of
Fulbright, Crooker and Freeman, of Houston,




"Another advantage is access to markets, perhaps the product of
experience, but none the less a real advantage. Few could hope to
have the ready ability to go intelligently into any desired market that
is possessed by the modern trust department or company.
"The qualities of financial strength, permanency and dependabil-
ity afford prestige; there is the 'know-how' that comes from experience,
the contacts that come from repetition and continuity of similar work
or transactions, the knowledge that comes from adequate factual infor-
mation-all of these put the corporate executor and trustee in a pre-
ferred position with respect to transactions affecting trust property."
0
Each of the institutions named below acts
as Executor and Trustee:
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
